Duquesne Law Review
Volume 35

Number 4

Article 8

1997

Labor Law - National Labor Relations Act - Good Faith Doubt as to
Majority Status
Melissa A. Weber

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Melissa A. Weber, Labor Law - National Labor Relations Act - Good Faith Doubt as to Majority Status, 35
Duq. L. Rev. 1093 (1997).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol35/iss4/8

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

LABOR LAW-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-GOOD FAITH
DOUBT AS TO MAJORITY STATUs-The United States Supreme

Court held that an employer with a good faith doubt as to a
union's majority status must make known the doubt as soon as it
arises or the union's power to negotiate and accept a bargaining
agreement for its members remains in effect.
Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 116 S. Ct.
1754 (1996).
Auciello Iron Works, Inc. ("Auciello") maintains an iron
fabrication shop in Hudson, Massachusetts, where it employs
twenty-three maintenance and production employees.'
Shopmen's Local No. 501, a/w International Association of
Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO (the
"Union") has represented the Auciello employees since its certification by the National Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB") in
1977.2

On September 21, 1988, the Union and Auciello began negotiations to replace their collective bargaining agreement that was
due to expire on September 25, 1988.3 Although a series of negotiation sessions were held, none produced any results acceptable
to both parties.4 As a result, the Union commenced a strike on
October 14, 1988. 5 By November 14, 1988, Auciello noticed
1.

National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Auciello Iron Works, Inc., 980 F.2d 804, 805 (1st Cir.

1992).
2. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. Shopmen's Local Union No. 501, 303 N.L.R.B. 562,
563 (1991).
3. Auciello, 980 F.2d at 806. During the negotiations, the Union was represented

by Robert Thomas, the international representative, David Mortimer, the local representative and Joseph Parenti, shop steward. Auciello, 303 N.L.R.B. at 564. Auciello was
represented by John D. O'Reilly III, Esq., Gerald Sauer, controller and Manilo De
Grandis, plant supervisor. Id.

4. Auciello, 303 N.L.R.B. at 564. On September 21, 1988, the Union presented a
written collective bargaining agreement proposal to Auciello. Id. Auciello agreed to some
of the minor provisions, but disagreed with the major substantive issues contained in the
Union's proposal. Id. On September 30, 1988, Auciello presented the Union with its written contract proposal, but this was later rejected by the Union. Id.
5. Id. The prior evening, the Union held a meeting at which the membership
voted to set up a picket line at Auciello's plant. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Auciello Iron
Works, Inc. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 116 S. Ct. 1754 (1996XNo. 95-668).
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employee support for the Union to be decreasing.6 Thereafter, on
November 17, 1988, Auciello submitted a negotiation proposal to
the Union that was far less generous than prior proposals it had
made.7 On November 19, 1988, the Union informally withdrew
the picket line at Auciello.8
Approximately one week later, the Union sent a Sunday evening telegram to Auciello stating that the Union accepted
Auciello's November 17 proposal. 9 The following morning,
Auciello sent a telegram to the Union stating it would not sign
the agreement containing the November 17, 1988 proposal and,
in fact, was withdrawing formal recognition of the Union. 10
As a result of Auciello's actions, the Union filed unfair labor
practice charges against Auciello with the NLRB. 1" The Union
alleged that Auciello committed unfair labor practices in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA") by refusing to sign a proposed collective bargaining
2
agreement and withdrawing recognition of a certified union.
6. Brief for Petitioner at 5. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. National Labor Re!. Bd.,
116 S. Ct. 1754 (1996XNo. 95-668). Some employees crossed the picket line and resigned
from the Union. Id. Additionally, several employees told Auciello management that the
employees no longer supported the Union. Id.
7. Id. Auciello's representatives stated that the Union representatives "stormed"
out of the bargaining session, apparently unhappy with Auciello's proposal. Auciello, 303
N.L.R.B. at 564.
8. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 116 S. Ct. 1754, 1757
(1996). Around November 20, 1988, the Union representative contacted Auciello to see if
additional bargaining sessions were necessary. Auciello, 303 N.L.R.B. at 564. Auciello
indicated that its position remained unchanged and therefore another bargaining session
was not needed. Id. The NLRB found no evidence that either party rejected the other's
last proposal during this telephone conversation. Id.
9. Auciello, 116 S. Ct. at 1757. The Union's telegram read as follows:
After careful consideration the proposed contract submitted by your company on
November 17, 1988 to Local Union 501 has (sic) unanimously ratified by our negotiating committee. The strike at your plant has concluded as of this date and
employees have been advised to return to work on Monday November 28, 1988.
Auciello, 303 N.L.R.B. at 564.
10. Auciello, 980 F.2d at 806-07. Auciello's telegram read as follows:
Employer position in response to your notice of November 27 is as follows: 1.
Employer offer of November 17 was rejected by Local 501 and is no longer open for
unilateral acceptance. 2. In any event your claimed ratificaation [sic] limiting to
negoatiating [sic] committee and excluding rank and file membership is insufficient. Employer now has reason to believe that Local 501 no longer represents a
majority of employees in appropriate unit and therefore disavows any obligation to
carry on further negotiations.
Auciello, 303 N.L.R.B. at 564.
11. Auciello, 980 F.2d at 807. The Union filed the original complaint on December
1, 1988, and amended the complaint on January 17, 1989. Id.
12. Id. Section 8(aX5) of the NLRA reads: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994). Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA reads: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994).
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The NLRB issued a complaint on January 17,3 1989 charging
Auciello with violating these NLRA provisions.'
An Administrative Law Judge ("Judge") found that there was
a lawful agreement between Auciello and the Union that prevented Auciello from withdrawing its Union recognition, even
though the withdrawal was based on a good faith doubt as to the
Union's majority status. 14 Thus, the Judge found Auciello violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA by refusing to sign the
collective bargaining agreement based upon its November 17,
1988 proposal. 15 Auciello filed exceptions to the decision and a
supporting brief with the NLRB, who affirmed the Judge's findings and ordered Auciello to sign the collective bargaining agreement and make whole any employees who would have benefitted
from the November 17, 1988 proposal. 6 The NLRB then filed a
petition for enforcement with the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, but this court remanded the case back to the
17

NLRB.

On remand, the NLRB held that a valid contract had been
formed between Auciello and the Union as of November 28, 1988,
13. Auciello, 980 F.2d at 807. Once a party files a charge alleging that an unfair
labor practice has occurred, the regional office of the NLRB conducts an investigation as
to the validity of the charge. BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR & FRED WrINEY, LABOR RELATIONS
LAw, 183-86 (5th ed. 1987). If the charge is valid, the regional office of the NLRB issues a
complaint in the case. Id. Once a complaint is issued, the matter can be heard by an
administrative law judge. Id. If the administrative law judge finds that a violation has
occurred, relief will be awarded to the aggrieved party. Id. If no complaint is issued, the
case is dismissed. Id.
14. Auciello, 980 F.2d at 807.
15. Id. The Judge made the following conclusions of law: 1) Auciello was an
employer within the meaning of sections 2(6) and (7) of the NLRA; 2) Local 501 was a
labor organization as defined by section 2(5) of the NLRA; 3) the employees at Auciello
constituted a "unit appropriate for collective bargaining" under section 9(b) of the NLRA;
4) ratification of the collective bargaining agreement by the Union membership was not
necessary to form a binding agreement; 5) Auciello's November 17, 1988 proposal was
open at the time of the Union's acceptance; 6) the Union's November 27, 1988 telegram
constituted acceptance of the November 17, 1988 proposal and formed a collective bargaining agreement; 7) Auciello's withdrawal of recognition of the union was untimely; 8)
Auciello violated sections 8(aX) and (5) of the NLRA by failing to sign the collective
bargaining agreement; 9) Auciello violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA by refusing to bargain with a certified union; and 10) the violation committed by Auciello affected
commerce as defined by sections 2(6) and (7) of the NLRA. Auciello, 303 N.L.R.B. at 567.
16. Auciello, 980 F.2d at 807.
17. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. Shopmen's Local Union No. 501, 317 N.L.R.B. 364,
364 (1995). The First Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the NLRB to
hear argument on the issue of whether Auciello could present evidence that the Union
lacked majority status at the time it accepted the November 17, 1988 proposal and was
therefore incapable of creating a valid agreement. Auciello, 980 F.2d at 812. Specifically,
the First Circuit directed the NLRB to discuss the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Chicago
Tribune Co. v. NationalLaborRel. Bd., 965 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 79 F.3d
604 (7th Cir. 1996)(holding that an offer during bargaining is not unconditionally valid if
circumstances have changed since the offer was made or renewed). Id. at 813.
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since Auciello did not assert its good faith doubt as to the Union's
majority status prior to the Union's acceptance of Auciello's
November 17, 1988 proposal."' The NLRB's petition for enforcement was then granted by the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit. 19 Auciello subsequently filed a petition for writ
of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.20
The Supreme Court granted the petition on January 19, 1996.
On appeal, the issue was whether an employer may disavow a
collective bargaining agreement with a union because of a good
faith doubt as to the union's majority status.
In examining this issue, the Court looked at the NLRA in
detail and noted that Congress designed the NLRA to promote
industrial peace and stability between employers and employees. 2 1 The Court then stated that the NLRA creates certain presumptions in favor of unions. For instance, majority status
during the first year of certification and during the term of a collective bargaining agreement are irrebuttable absent extraordinary circumstances.2 At any other time during the union's
incumbency, its majority status is rebuttable.24
18. Auciello, 317 N.L.R.B. at 366. The NLRB distinguished between "actual loss"
of majority status and a "good faith" doubt of majority status. Id. at 365 n.14. The NLRB
stated that when challenging the actual loss of majority status, an employer must show
actual figures that support the lack of majority claim. Id. If an employer is trying to
prove a good faith doubt as to majority status, however, the employer only needs to present circumstantial evidence to meet the burden of proof. Id.
19. National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Auciello Iron Works, Inc., 60 F.3d 24, 25 (1st Cir.
1995). The First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the NLRB that the present case
did not fall within the exception allowing a company to refuse to sign a collective bargaining agreement when a good faith doubt as to majority status arises simultaneously with
the union's acceptance of a proposal. Auciello, 60 F.3d at 26 n.2.
20. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 116 S. Ct. 805 (1996).
Certiorari is defined as:
A writ of common origin law issued by a superior to an inferior court requiring the
latter to produce a certified record of a particular case tried therein. The writ is
issued in order that the court issuing the writ may inspect the proceedings and
determine whether there has been any irregularities.
BLAcK's LAw DICTIoNARY 228 (6th ed. 1990).

21. Auciello, 116 S. Ct. at 1758. According to Congress, industrial peace and stability can only be obtained through implementation of collective bargaining agreements
that allow employers, employees and labor organizations to amicably resolve disputes. 29
U.S.C. § 141(b) (1994).
22. Auciello, 116 S.Ct. at 1758.
23. Id. See also Bickerstaff Clay Products Co., Inc. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 871
F.2d 980, 981 (11th Cir. 1989).
24. Auciello, 116 S.Ct. at 1758. See also National Labor Rel. Bd.v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 778 (1990). The Court in Curtin Matheson stated that
the majority status presumption can be overcome by the employer "by showing that, at
the time of the refusal to bargain, either (1) the union did not in fact enjoy majority support, or (2) the employer had a 'good-faith' doubt, founded on a sufficient objective basis, of
the union's majority support." Id.
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Auciello argued that there should not be a specific cut-off date
for expressing a good faith doubt as to a union's majority status
and that the cut-off limit should be determined on a case-by-case
basis.25 The Court reasoned that although this "reasonable time
to repudiate" argument seemed valid, there was nothing inherently unlawful or unreasonable in the Board's "bright-line
rule."26 According to the Court, Auciello had ample opportunity
to question the Union's majority status prior to the Union's
acceptance of Auciello's November 17, 1988 proposal.27 The
Court suggested that Auciello could have withdrawn the November 17 offer and petitioned for a representative election,2 refused
to bargain based on a good faith doubt as to the Union's majority
status or withdrawn its November 17 proposal and investigated
its doubts as to the Union's majority status.29
Auciello also argued that it was not required to bargain with
the Union, as section 7 of the NLRA allows employees to choose
their own bargaining representatives and, clearly, the Union no
longer represented a majority of employees at Auciello since most
of the employees had resigned from the Union. 30 In rejecting this
argument, the Court stated that the employees did not choose to
decertify the Union on their own, therefore allowing Auciello to
ignore the Union's power to negotiate would not promote the
goals of the NLRA. 3 '
In conclusion, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision by the
Court of Appeals and held that Auciello committed unfair labor
practices in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA
because it did not raise its "good faith doubt" refusal to recognize
the collective bargaining agreement prior to the contract formation.32 The Court then required Auciello to sign the collective
bargaining agreement and make whole any employees who
would have benefitted from the November 17, 1988 proposal. 3
25. Auciello, 116 S. Ct. at 1759.
26. Id. The NLRB's "bright-line rule" provides that an employer no longer has the
opportunity to raise a good faith doubt as to majority status after a contract between the
employer and union has been formed. Id.
27. Id.
28. The NLRB will order a representative election when a majority of employees in
a bargaining unit submit a petition requesting an election. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1994).
29. Auciello, 116 S. Ct. at 1759.
30. Id. at 1760.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1761. The Court quoted the NLRB and said that a ruling to the contrary
would give employers "unilatera[l] control [over] a vital part of the collective bargaining
process" and "would undermine the stability of the collective -bargaining relationship."
Id. at 1759 (quoting Auciello, 317 N.L.R.B. at 374).
33. Id.
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Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935 on the heels of the Great
Depression.34 The NLRA encourages employees to organize in
the workplace and solve problems with their employers through
collective bargaining rather than strikes or other means that
adversely affect commerce.35 Congress believed that by encouraging employee organization, the inequality in bargaining power
between employers and employees that existed prior to the
NLRA would be eliminated,
resulting in a more satisfied and pro36
ductive workforce.

Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA, the two sections in issue
in Auciello, address two of the enumerated unfair labor practices
that may arise under this Act. 37 Section 8(a)(1) provides that an
employer commits an unfair labor practice if it hinders the
employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.3 8 Section
8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse
to bargain with the employees' chosen union representative.39
34. National Labor Relations (Wagner-Connery) Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994)). The Wagner-Connery Act,
which was incorporated into the NLRA, provided for the regulation of employer conduct
and created five employer unfair labor practices violating the rights of employees. Id.
The Taft-Hartley Act, enacted in 1947 and later incorporated into the NLRA, provided for
the creation of the office of General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, the
decertification petition, union unfair labor practices and the abolition of the union-only
shop. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 135
(1947). The Landrun-Griffin Act, enacted in 1959 and incorporated into the NLRA,
sought to eliminate, or at least prevent, the inappropriate actions undertaken by some
unions. Labor Management Report and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
36. Id. Section 151(a) of the NLRA reads, in pertinent part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id.
37. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(aXl), (5) (1994).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a01) (1994). Section 7 of the NLRA provides, in relevant part:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. .. ." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994). Section 9 of the NLRA provides that any representatives "selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees... shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees .... " 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1994). There are some instances in which an employer may refuse to bargain with a
union but not commit an unfair labor practice under either section 8(a)(1) or (5) of the
NLRA. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune Co. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 965 F.2d 244 (7th Cir.
1992)(holding that an employer did not commit an unfair labor practice by refusing to
sign a collective bargaining agreement accepted by a union who had lost majority status).
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In 1943, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the
issue of whether an employer may refuse to bargain with a
NLRB certified union without violating section 8 of the NLRA in
National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Botany Worsted Mills.' In Botany,
the NLRB certified the Textile Workers Union of America as the
bargaining representative of Botany's employees. 4 ' Shortly after
the election, twenty of the thirty-two employees who had chosen
the Textile Workers as their bargaining unit wrote a letter to
Botany management stating that they no longer wished to be
represented by the union.42 As a result, Botany refused to bargain with the union, and the union promptly filed an unfair labor
practice charge against Botany with the NLRB. 4 3 At a subsequent hearing, the NLRB issued an order requiring Botany to
bargain collectively with the union." At the hearing on the Petition for Enforcement, Botany argued to the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals that since the workers no longer wished to be represented by the Textile Workers, the NLRB should refuse to recog4
nize the union as the employees' bargaining representative. 5
The Third Circuit held that allowing the NLRB to disregard a
union election and recognize the current desires of the employees
would not promote the goals of the NLRA. 46 The court specifically held that since an election is the appropriate means of
determining employee desires, the Botany employees should
have asked the NLRB for a new election if they no longer wished
to be represented by the Textile Workers.4 7 In conclusion, the
40. 133 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1943).
41. Botany, 133 F.2d at 881. The Textile Workers were certified by the NLRB on
December 13, 1940. Id.
42. Id. The letter from the employees read as follows:
A goodly precentage [sic] of we wool sorters [sic] and trappers do not think being
members of the C.I.O. will benefit us or our fellow workers and therefore do not
wish to join that organization.
Id.
43. Id. at 878. The union alleged that Botany violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the NLRA. Id. at 878-79.
44. Id. at 879.
45. Id. at 881.
46. Botany, 133 F.2d at 881. The court stated that allowing the NLRB to recognize
a new union after one has been certified by the NLRB as the representative of the employees would "make chaos out of the administration of the statute and prevent the protection
of the very rights which it aimed to secure." Id.
47. Id. at 882. Under the NLRA, if more than thirty percent of the employees at an
employer no longer wish to be represented by an incumbent union, the employees can
petition the NLRB for a decertification election pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 159(cXl)(A)(ii)
(1994). The procedure for decertification is as follows: 1) the employees should submit a
petition to the NLRB stating that the union no longer represents the interests of the
employees; 2) the NLRB will conduct an investigation into the matter; 3) if the NLRB
finds that there is a reasonable question as to representation, a hearing will be held; 4) if
the NLRB finds after conducting a hearing that a question of representation exists, the
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Third Circuit required Botany to negotiate with the Textile
Workers since an election designated the union as the active representative of the employees. 48
The United States Supreme Court was presented with a very
similar fact situation to Botany in Brooks v. National Labor Rel.
Bd.49 In Brooks, the International Association of Machinists won
a representative election and was certified by the NLRB as the
employees' representative at Brooks' Chrysler-Plymouth establishment. 50 A day before the NLRB certification, nine of the thirteen employees represented by the union wrote a letter to Brooks
announcing their wish not to be represented by the union."'
After receiving this letter, Brooks refused to negotiate with the
union." The union then filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the NLRB. 53 The NLRB found that Brooks' refusal to bargain was an unfair labor practice in violation of sections 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the NLRA. 54 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted the NLRB's Petition for Enforcement, and Brooks
timely filed for a writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court.55
On appeal, the Supreme Court looked at the issue of whether
an employer must bargain with a union who has lost its majority
status during its. first year of certification.5" Before reaching a
decision, the Supreme Court examined the historical perspective
of the NLRA. 57 The Court noted that under the Wagner-Connery
Act, which was incorporated into the NLRA, the NLRB is to certify a union as the employees' representative where the union is
favored by a majority of the employees. 5 The Court then recogNLRB will direct an election by secret ballot and certify the results of that election. 29
U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(AXii) (1994).
48. Botany, 133 F.2d at 883.
49. 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
50. Brooks, 348 U.S. at 97. The International Ass'n of Machinists, District Lodge
No. 727 won the representative election at Brooks' plant by a vote of five to eight. Id. at
97.
51. Id. This letter read as follows: "We, the undersigned majority of employees...
are not in favor of being represented by Union Local 727 as a bargaining agent." Id.
52. Id. Brooks relied on the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
NationalLabor Rel. Bd.v. Vulcan Forging,Co., 188 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 195 1)(holding that
an employer is not in violation of the NLRA for refusing to bargain with a union after a
majority of the employees in the union express the desire to no longer be represented by
the union for purposes of collective bargaining). Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Brooks, 348 U.S. at 98.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 98-102.
58. Id. See National Labor Relations (Wagner-Connery) Act of 1935, ch. 372, section 9(c), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935).
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nized that under the Taft-Hartley Act, which was later incorporated into the NLRA, once elected and certified, the employees
cannot revoke the bargaining power of a union within the first
year of representation. 9 Once this one year period is over, however, employees have the power to decertify an incumbent union
if the union no longer represents the employees' interests.6
After reviewing the NLRA history, the Court rejected Brooks'
argument that when employees no longer wish to be represented
by the duly elected and certified union, the employer may refuse
to bargain with that union.6 1 The Court enunciated that as a
matter of policy, an employer must continue to bargain with a
certified union even though the employer believes the union to no
longer represent a majority of the employees. 6 21 According to the
Court, to allow an employer to do otherwise would violate the
provisions of the NLRA regarding the selection and rejection of
bargaining representatives and cause industrial instability by
allowing representative elections to be held without regard to the
NLRA's timing of elections3 The Court also noted that the
NLRB has discretion when carrying out the policies of the
NLRA4 Finding that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion in
this case by requiring Brooks to negotiate with the International
Association of Machinists, the Court enforced the NLRB's order
requiring Brooks to bargain with the union. 5
In InternationalLadies' Garment Workers' Union v. National
Labor Rel. Bd., 6 the United States Supreme Court determined
whether an employer commits an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8 of the NLRA by negotiating with a union that
59. Brooks, 348 U.S. at 98-102. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act, PL. No. 101, sections 9(c), (e)(1), 61 Stat. 135, 144-46 (1947).
60. Brooks, 348 U.S. at 100-01. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act, section 9(c), 61 Stat. 135, 144-45 (1947). After the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act,
the circuits split on the issue of whether to grant a petition for enforcement based on a
refusal to bargain in light of the new decertification provisions. See, e.g., Vulcan Forging,
188 F.2d 927 (denying enforcement) and Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. National
Labor Relations Bd., 204 F.2d 613 (6th Cir. 1953) (denying enforcement); National Labor
Relations Bd. v. Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co., 199 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1952) (declaring that
enforcement should be granted on a case by case basis).
61. Brooks, 348 U.S. at 103. Brooks based this assertion on the fact that employees
have the right to select their own bargaining representative under the NLRA. Id.
62. Id. The Court noted that employees are encouraged to decertify a uni6n that no
longer represents their interests. Id. See supra note 47 for discussion on decertification
of an incumbent union.
63. Brooks, 348 U.S. at 103. The NLRA allows an employer who doubts a union's
majority status to petition the NLRB for an election or other relief. 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c)(IXB) (1994).
64. Brooks, 348 U.S. at 104.

65. Id.
66.

366 U.S. 731 (1961).
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the employer believes represents a majority of the employees,
but in reality represents a minority of the employees.6 7 In Garment Workers', the Garment Workers' union initiated an organizational campaign at Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corporation's
plant.6 During the campaign, some of the employees at the
plant went on strike. 9 When the union collected authorization
cards from a majority of the employees, or at least what it
believed was a majority, it approached the employer in an effort
to begin negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement.7 v
The employer, without checking to verify that the authorization
cards in fact represented a majority of its employees, began negotiating with the union.7 ' By the time a collective bargaining
agreement was reached, the union did represent a majority.72
The General Counsel of the NLRB filed a complaint against both
the Garment Workers' union and the employer for violating section 8 of the NLRA. v3
The Court held that since the NLRA does not require knowledge of wrongdoing as an element of an unfair labor practice, the
employer committed an unfair labor practice by negotiating with
a union that did not represent a majority of the employees. 4 In
reaching this holding, the Court noted that no particular hardship would be placed on employers if they were required to take
reasonable steps to affirm a union's majority status.7 v
In Viking Lithographers, Inc. v. Miami PrintingPressmen &
Assistants' Union, Local 207,76 the NLRB was presented with the
question of whether a violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
NLRA occurs when an employer refuses to bargain with a duly
67. Garment Workers', 366 U.S. at 732.
68. Id. at 733. The organizational campaign at Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corporation's plant began in October of 1956. Id.
69. Id. The strike was commenced to protest against a proposed wage reduction in
the Topping Department of the Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corporation's plant. Id.
70. Id. at 734.
71. Id.
72. Garment Workers', 366 U.S. at 735. The NLRB found that as of August 30,
1957, the union represented a majority of the employees. Id. at 734 n.4.
73. Id. at 732, 735. The General Counsel alleged the employer could not assert
good faith as a defense to the unfair labor practice charge as it could have checked the
union authorization cards against its employment records to determine if the signed
authorization cards did in fact represent a majority of the employees. Id. Additionally,
the General Counsel alleged that the union had committed an unfair labor practice by
depriving the employees of their organizational rights contained in section 7 of the NLRA.

Id.
74. Id. at 739.
75. Id. The Court also explained that even if the employer errs in withholding
union recognition, the employer is subject only to a remedial order and not a monetary
fine. Id. at 740.
76. 184 N.L.R.B. 139 (1970).
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certified union, but can assert sufficient objective reasons to buttress an alleged good faith doubt as to the union's majority status. 77 In Viking Lithographers, the NLRB certified Local 207 on

March 11, 1968 as the exclusive representative of the employees
at Viking's plant. 7 The union and Viking then engaged in sev79
eral bargaining sessions until the middle of January of 1969.
During mid to late January of 1969, there was a brief exchange
of letters between the union and Viking.' ° Between February 3
and May 5, 1969, however, Viking and the union did not communicate with one another .8 On May 5, 1969, the union sent a telegram to Viking stating that it accepted the company's last offer. 2
On May 7, 1969, Viking received the union's telegram, but
informed the union that nothing further could be done in this
matter until the President of Viking returned from out of town.8
Thereafter, on May 14, 1969, Viking informed the union that it
had a good faith doubt regarding the union's majority status and,
therefore, was withdrawing from negotiations for a collective
bargaining agreement with the union. 4 The union then filed a
charge against Viking alleging an unfair labor practice under
sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA.

The NLRB held that Viking did not commit an unfair labor
practice by failing to sign the union accepted collective bargaining agreement.8s In reaching this decision, the NLRB found that
the employees' expression of little or no interest in the union and
the union's behavior during and after negotiations was "lackadaisical," and, therefore, Viking was not unreasonable in believing that the union hurriedly entered into a contract with Viking
77. Viking Lithographers, 184 N.L.R.B. at 140.
78. Id. Local 207 won the representative election at Viking by a vote of thirteen to
eight. Id. at 139.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 141.
82. Viking Lithographers, 184 N.L.R.B. at 141. The union's telegram read as
follows:
This is to advise that the Union accepted the last Company offer, Sunday, May 4,
1969. Please prepare the Contract for proper signatures. Will call you next Tuesday or Monday, when I am in Miami. Regards, Larry J. Smith, Representative,
IPP & AU of NA.

Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The May 14, 1968 letter from Viking stated that the President of Viking
believed that the union had not represented a majority of the employees at Viking for
several months prior to the union's acceptance of Viking's final proposal. Id.
85. Id. at 142.
86. Id. at 140. The Trial Examiner in this case found that an unfair labor practice
had been committed by Viking. Id. at 143. The NLRB adopted the Trial Examiner's
findings, yet found the facts of the case to warrant a different conclusion. Id. at 139-40.
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as an attempt to secure its status as bargaining representative of
the Viking employees.8 v Even though there were no facts illustrating that the union indeed lost majority support, the NLRB
believed that the facts presented at the hearing created an objective basis upon which Viking could assert its good faith doubt as
to the union's majority status.8 Thus, the NLRB found that
Viking had not committed an unfair labor practice in violation of
sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA when it withdrew recognition of the union. 9
In Belcon, Inc. v. Building Material & Dump Truck Drivers
Local 420,9' the NLRB again addressed the issue of whether an
employer engages in an unfair labor practice under sections
8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA by failing to execute a collective bargaining agreement accepted by a certified union.9 ' In Belcon, a
collective bargaining agreement between the union and Belcon
was due to expire on November 14, 1979.92 In September of
1979, the union and Belcon commenced negotiations for a successor agreement. 93 At the first meeting, the union submitted a proposal for a new contract, but Belcon requested time to examine
the substantive issues contained in the proposal.9 4 Belcon subsequently submitted a counterproposal to the union with its final
offer on November 13, 1979. 95 The union membership rejected
this proposal despite the union's recommendation of acceptance
and began picketing at Belcon the following morning to express
dissatisfaction with the failure to reach a new collective bargaining agreement.9 6 On November 29, 1979, in response to the picketing, an additional bargaining session was held between the
union and Belcon.97 Thereafter, another vote of the union membership was conducted, but this time the membership approved
87.
88.

Viking Lithographers, 184 N.L.R.B. at 140.
Id.

89. Id. The NLRB dismissed the complaint against Viking after finding that no
violation of the NLRA had occurred. Id.
90. 257 N.L.R.B. 1341 (1981).
91.

Belcon, 257 N.L.R.B. at 1341.

92. Id. at 1342. The union had been the exclusive bargaining representative at
Belcon since 1967. Id.
93. Id. The collective bargaining agreement in place at this time was due to expire
on November 14, 1979. Id.
94. Id. at 1343. The union requested, among other things, an increase in the wage
rate at Belcon, an increase in the amount of vacation days and better health and welfare
benefits for Belcon employees. Id. at 1342 n.4.
95. Id. at 1343. This offer included a wage increase for the employees, but did not
mention the employees' pension plan coverage. Id.
96. Belcon, 257 N.L.R.B. at 1343.
97. Id. at 1344. At this negotiating session, the union president, Gene McFadden,
requested that Belcon raise the amount of the wage increase in an effort to persuade the
striking employees to return to work. Id. Belcon's representative, David Morgan, indi-
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the Belcon offer and agreed to return to work. 98 The union representative then went to the Belcon plant and informed Belcon's
representative that the union was accepting Belcon's last offer. 99
The Belcon representative stated that it would have to ask its
counsel if the agreement was valid. 100 Once the union representative returned to union headquarters, he sent a mailgram to
Belcon stating that the union had accepted Belcon's final offer
made on November 14, 1979.11 The union stated the strikers
were ready to return to work, but Belcon informed the union that
striker replacements had been obtained and that the strikers
who had been replaced would have to be placed on a preferential
rehire list. 10 2 At this time, Belcon felt that the union was making
a counteroffer conditioned on the immediate return of the strikers to their former positions at Belcon. 10 3 On December 3, 1979,
as a result of this belief, Belcon sent a letter to the union stating
its refusal to negotiate further with the union and withdrawing
its final offer. 104
The NLRB held that Belcon's refusal to execute the accepted
collective bargaining agreement and withdrawal of union recognition constituted unfair labor practices in violation of sections
8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA. 10 5 In reaching this conclusion, the
NLRB reasoned that the union's promise that striking employees
would return to work was not a counteroffer, and thus, the union
unconditionally accepted Belcon's final contract proposal. 106
In Bickerstaff Clay Products Co., Inc. v. National Labor Rel.
Bd. ,1o7 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue
cated that this request was not feasible, however, as Belcon had no more money to offer to
the employees. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Belcon, 257 N.L.R.B. at 1344. Morgan, who was no longer working for Belcon
at the time of the hearing before the NLRB, testified that he had never received the mailgram from the union. Id. at 1344 n.9. Moreover, his successor at Belcon, Bryant Reed,
testified that he was unable to find a copy of the mailgram in any of Belcon's files. Id.
102. Id. at 1344. Individuals on a preferential rehire list are given an advantage
over individuals not on the preferential rehire list when an employer is seeking to employ
additional workers. BALLENTnirI's LAw DICTIONARY 977 (3d. ed. 1969).

103. Belcon, 257 N.L.R.B. at 1344. Robert Liebrich was the manager of labor relations at Belcon's parent company Airco Welding Products and provided Belcon with
advice in the area of labor negotiations. Id. at 1343. When asked whether he believed
the union was accepting Belcon's final offer, Liebrich responded that "he felt the Union
was making a counteroffer rather than accepting ... [Belcon's] final offer." Id. at 1344.
104. Id. at 1345.
105. Id. at 1341.
106. Id. at 1346. Since both the trial examiner and NLRB found a contract to exist
between Belcon and the union, the NLRB did not address Belcon's assertion regarding its
refusal to sign the labor agreement or negotiate further with the union. Id.
107. 871 F.2d 980 (11th Cir. 1989).
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of whether an employer who has a reasonable, good faith doubt
as to a union's majority status, and can support this doubt with
objective evidence, can withdraw its union recognition without
violating sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA.10 8 In this case,
Bickerstaff, the employer, and the incumbent union, Laborers'
Local Union No. 246, were negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement. 1 9 After the parties were unable to reach an
agreement, the union called a strike. 110 Bickerstaff then relayed
to the union via letter that although it wanted to increase the age
and welfare benefits of its employees, the only way to accomplish
this goal since negotiations were at an impasse was to put into
effect the final proposal previously offered to the union by Bickerstaff.'' Approximately two and a half months later, the union
notified Bickerstaff by letter that it would accept Bickerstaffs
final proposal and call an end to the strike." 2 The next day,
Bickerstaff informed the union that events occurring since its
113
final offer made Bickerstaff unable to accept the union's offer.
Moreover, Bickerstaff refused to bargain further with the union
based on its belief that the union no longer represented a majority of Bickerstaff employees. 14 The union subsequently charged
Bickerstaff with committing unfair labor practices in violation of
sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA. 115
An Administrative Law Judge found that Bickerstaff violated
sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA by refusing to negotiate with
the union.116 Subsequently, Bickerstaff filed exceptions with the
NLRB. 117 After a hearing, the NLRB found that Bickerstaff
failed to present sufficient objective evidence to support its good
faith doubt as to the union's majority status and affirmed the
108. Bickerstaff, 871 F.2d at 982.
109. Id. The union had been the bargaining representative at Bickerstaff since
1965. Id. The bargaining agreement in effect at the time of this dispute was set to expire
on October 31, 1985, but, because of a mutual agreement between the parties, was
extended to November 10, 1985. Id.
110. Id. A total of ten negotiating sessions were held prior to the strike and a total
of four negotiating sessions were held after commencement of the strike. Id. at 982-83.
111. Id. at 983 n.3.
112. Id. at 983.
113. Bickerstaff, 871 F.2d at 983. The events relied upon by Bickerstaff included the
hiring of replacement workers, abandonment of the strike by some of the employees at
Bickerstaff, strike associated violence, a breakdown in union leadership, written resignations of union affiliation by fifteen former union members, inactivity of the union during
the two and a half months between Bickerstaffs offer and the union's acceptance,
employee dissatisfaction with the union and, finally, composition of the union on the date
of Bickerstafis withdrawal of recognition. Id. at 985-87.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 984.
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Administrative Law Judge's decision." 8 Shortly thereafter,
Bickerstaff filed a petition with the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals asking the court to set aside the NLRB's decision. 1 9
The Eleventh Circuit refused to enforce the NLRB's order and
found that Bickerstaff did not violate sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the NLRA by failing to execute the contract that the union had
accepted. 20 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that
whether a union enjoys majority status must be viewed objectively to determine if the good faith doubt is reasonably grounded
in fact. 12 If an employer establishes that its good faith doubt as
to a union's majority status is reasonably grounded in fact, the
presumption of majority status is overcome and the union must
prove that it did in fact enjoy majority status on the date of the
22
agreement.

1

The court in Bickerstaff found that there were several pieces of
evidence tending to prove the union's lack of majority support at
the time it accepted Bickerstaffs final offer.123 Therefore, Bickerstaffs doubt as to the union's majority status was sufficiently
supported and the union's presumption of majority status overcome.' 2 Furthermore, the court stated that Bickerstaff did not
have a duty to explicitly withdraw its final employment offer by
union notification because employment circumstances had dramatically changed since it first submitted the offer. 125 Bickerstaff
also did not commit an unfair labor practice by failing to recognize and negotiate further with the union after the union had
effectively disavowed its relationship with the bargaining unit
26
employees.

In Chicago Tribune Co. v. National Labor Rel. Bd. ,127 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
addressed the question of whether an employer may refuse to
118.

Bickerstaff, 871 F.2d at 984.

119. Id. The NLRB filed a cross appeal for enforcement of the decision with the
court after Bickerstaff filed its appeal. Id.
120. Id. at 994.
121. Id. at 985. The court stated that even though this is an objective test, "subjective evidence may be used to bolster the argument that such doubt existed at the relevant
time." Id. (quoting National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Windham Community Mem'l Hosp., 577
F.2d 805, 811 (2d Cir. 1978)).
122. Id.
123. Bickerstaff, 871 F.2d at 993.
124. Id. Evidence supporting the contention that the union lacked majority status
included the fact that strikers had returned to work, employees expressed dissatisfaction
with the union and there was a breakdown in union leadership. Id.
125. Id. The court stated that no authority exists "for the proposition that withdrawal of a prior offer is a condition precedent to an employer's withdrawal of recognition
based on a good faith doubt of the Union's majority status." Id.
126. Id. at 994.
127. 965 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1992).
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sign a collective bargaining agreement once a certified union has
accepted the agreement. 1'8 In Chicago Tribune, negotiations for
a new collective bargaining agreement between the union and
Chicago Tribune proved unproductive and a strike was called.' 29
After the strike commenced, the Chicago Tribune hired replacement workers, which angered the striking employees. 3 0 On
March 2, 1987, while still in the midst of the strike, the Chicago
Tribune sent a letter to the union stating that its final offer
remained unchanged.' 3 1 On July 27, 1987, the union informed
the Chicago Tribune that it was unconditionally accepting the
Chicago Tribune's final offer. 32 The Chicago Tribune alleged
that the union no longer represented a majority of its employees
and refused to sign the agreement. 1' The union filed an unfair
labor practice charge with the NLRB, who subsequently found
that the Chicago Tribune had committed an unfair labor practice
in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA by refusing to
sign a valid collective bargaining agreement. 3 4 Cross-petitions
for review and enforcement of the NLRB's order were subse35
quently filed by both the Chicago Tribune and the union.
The Seventh Circuit refused to enforce the NLRB's order to
negotiate, holding that the Chicago Tribune did not commit an
unfair labor practice by refusing to sign the collective bargaining
agreement. 36 In reaching this conclusion, the court reiterated
the labor law principle established in Bickerstaff that an offer
made in connection with negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement by either party will remain open until specifically withdrawn or the circumstances surrounding the offer have
changed making the offer per se invalid. 3 7 The court then stated
that if an employer presents a union with an offer that is not
128. Chicago Tribune, 965 F.2d at 246.
129. Id.
130. Id. The striking employees slashed tires, broke windows, fire-bombed a supervisor's garage and even made death threats to various individuals. Id.
131. Id. at 249. The final offer that was referenced in the Chicago Tribune's letter
was the offer dated June of 1986. Id. at 248. The Chicago Tribune also indicated that it
had filed a petition for decertification of the union with the NLRB in light of the recent
events. Id. at 249.
132. Id. at 248.
133. Chicago Tribune, 965 F.2d at 248. The prior month, a poll was conducted by
the Chicago Tribune that revealed that two hundred and sixty-five of two hundred and
seventy-two employees at the Chicago Tribune no longer wished to be represented by the
union. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 246.
136. Id. at 251.
137. Id. at 248-49. The court stated that the offeror should know an offer is withdrawn if the circumstances existing at the time of the offer have dramatically changed
and no longer exist at the time of the alleged acceptance. Id. at 249.
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accepted until after the union loses majority support, the offer is
deemed withdrawn and can no longer be accepted.1 "' According
to the court, any other rule would go against the NLRA's goal of
13 9
promoting equality between the two negotiating parties.
The court also stated that finding the Chicago Tribune in violation of the NLRA for refusing to sign the collective bargaining
agreement would promote further injustice, as this holding
would force the company to negotiate with a union that it knows
represents a minority of the workers. 14 Furthermore, the court
noted that such action was expressly forbidden and declared an
unfair labor practice in Garment Workers' 14' Thus, the court
held that the Chicago Tribune could properly refuse to sign the
collective bargaining agreement that arose out of the union's
acceptance of the company's last negotiation offer' 42
In deciding Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. National Labor Rel.
Bd. ,143 the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to
resolve a conflict between the circuits as to when and how an
employer may refuse to recognize a NLRB certified union's
acceptance of a labor contract proposal. By enforcing the NLRB's
order to implement the collective bargaining agreement formed
on November 27, 1988 and recognize the Union as the exclusive
bargaining agent for Auciello's employees, 144 the Supreme Court
seems to have enunciated a principle establishing that an
employer with a good faith doubt as to a union's majority status
must make the doubt known immediately or negotiate with the
union, since the union will still have the power to accept a bargaining agreement for its members.
The Auciello Court dismissed Auciello's argument that the
appropriate time for asserting a good faith doubt should be
examined on a case-by-case basis. If the Court allowed Auciello's
argument to stand, however, it may have found no unfair labor
practice occurred when Auciello refused to negotiate further with
the Union since Auciello's doubt was raised within a reasonable
time after the formation of the collective bargaining agreement.
138. Chicago Tribune, 965 F.2d at 249-50.
139. Id. at 250. The court stated that if a union was allowed to accept an offer after
it has lost majority support, "too much weight [would be given] to the interests of the
union and too little to the interests of workers." Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. National Labor Rel.
Bd., 366 U.S. 731 (1961Xholding that an employer may not knowingly sign a collective
bargaining agreement with a union that does not represent a majority of the employees in
the bargaining unit).
142. Chicago Tribune, 965 F.2d at 251.
143. Auciello, 116 S. Ct. 1754.
144. Auciello, 303 N.L.R.B. at 561.
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The Court may have realized, though, that such a holding would
have opened the doors of litigation by allowing an employer to
decide what is a reasonable time to repudiate a collective bargaining agreement and failed to give proper deference to the
NLRB's "bright-line rule." Also, by implementing the NLRB's
"bright-line rule" rather than Auciello's "reasonableness standard," the Court afforded employers a better understanding of
what is expected of them during negotiations with a union.
The Auciello Court also emphasized that allowing employers
to rely on an employee's section 7 rights under the NLRA in
refusing to bargain with the certified union would not promote
industrial peace. Such an action would, in effect, allow employers to choose a union to represent their employees, rather than
allow the employees the right to choose their own bargaining representative. 145 Although this is a sound decision, the Court failed
to address whether any evidence in Auciello established the
employees' knowledge that they had the right to decertify the
union or knew the proper decertification steps. Perhaps an
employer should be permitted to raise the argument that it
would violate the employees' section 7 rights under the NLRA if
it negotiated with a union when the employees believe that
expressing their desire not to be represented by the union is sufficient to remove the union from power.' 4 Since Auciello failed
to establish that the employees did not know the proper procedure to decertify the union, however, the Court correctly rejected
Auciello's section 7 argument.
In sum, the greatest lesson to be learned from Auciello Iron
Works, Inc. v. NationalLabor Rel. Bd. is that all parties involved
in labor negotiations should be aware of the importance of time.
As time passes, an action by one party that may be completely
lawful under the NLRA may become an unfair labor practice.
Perhaps by mandating compliance with the NLRB's "bright-line
rule" in Auciello, the Supreme Court has struck a balance
between the rights of employees and employers under the NLRA.
Melissa A. Weber

145. Aucieflo, 116 S. Ct. at 1760.
146. See supra note 38 for discussion on an employee's section 7 rights under the
NLRA.

